1.Introduction
A key macroeconomic development leading to the financial crises of in Europe was the emergence of very large deficits in the external current accounts (CAs) of Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain. In particular, the three southern countries posted CA deficits that exceeded 10% of GDP in the run-up to the crises. Not only were such deficits rather sizeable relative to those countries' own historical record since World War II, but also large relative to those typically observed in external financial crises in emerging markets -where "sudden stops" in capital inflows hit when the CA deficit rises above 4 to 5% of GDP (Catão and Milesi-Ferretti, 2014) .
To be sure, crisis-free countries with CA deficits of the order of 10% or so of GDP are not unheard of historically. Some of today's advanced economies such as Australia, Canada and some of the Scandinavian economies, experienced deficits approaching such magnitudes between the late 19 th century and early 20 th century, as swift growth of labor and capital inputs together with rising total factor productivity (TFP henceforth) and persistent improvement in the price of their exports relative to the domestic cost of producing them, assured investors that those deficits would be eventually reversed and the large accumulation of external liabilities be fully repaid.
Those conditions were not apparent in some of Eurozone by the eve of the 2009-12 financial crises. Table 1 shows that despite higher real GDP growth than the median of other non-crisis EU countries (3.9% vs. 2.2%) since the onset of the euro, key macroeconomic fundamentals were generally weaker -and some of them significantly so --in the four crisis countries. In particular, TFP growth was negative in three of the four countries; unit labor costs (measured as the ratio of the average wage to labor productivity) were also rising relative to the EU average in all four countries, implying that domestic production was getting costlier; and so was consumer goods' price inflation, implying an appreciation of the real exchange rate (the price of domestic vs. foreign goods expressed in the common currency) again pointing to a loss of external competitiveness. Finally and no less importantly, net foreign assets (NFA) -which is equal to the accumulation of current account balances plus valuation effects -were highly negative in Greece, Portugal and Spain at close to 100% of GDP. Furthermore, because openness to international trade (as measured by the ratio of exports of goods and services to GDP) was lower than the EU average -with the exception of Ireland, the ratio of net foreign assets to exports was even higher. This is an important indicator of the sustainability of external balances because, in the absence of valuation effects, the present value of net external liabilities has to be ultimately paid with net exports. (1999-2007) (1999-2007) (1999-2007) (1999-2007) (1999-2007) (1999-2007 The upshot is that weaker macroeconomic fundamentals made those four countries externally more "fragile" relative to other Eurozone peers. In those circumstances, as observed many times in macroeconomic crises in emerging markets in the past, a large external shock -such as that triggered by the financial panic in the US in the summer of 2008, can rapidly unravel high external deficits. 2 Figure 1 shows that the turnaround of current account balances was massive in all four countries from 2008 onwards.
3 2 This unraveling may not be immediate, however, and one might arguably expect it to be lengthier in advanced countries than in emerging markets. One reason is that the deeper international financial integration of advanced countries grants them access to a wider range of financing instruments. Another reason is greater policy credibility. Knowing that policy authorities can credibly commit to do "whatever it takes" to save a currency or a monetary regime, helps rule out extreme risk scenarios and thus aid the effectiveness of policy interventions. These factors help explain some of the lag between the financial crisis in the US and those in the Eurozone. 3 In many external crises of the past, the turnaround in the trade balance (which is typically the main component of the current account, equaling the latter minus net income from abroad and net current transfers) has been even larger of that of the current account. However, a current account reversal in major macroeconomic crises can be larger than that of the trade balance. This happens, for instance, if residents cut down their payments to foreigners (as in defaults or debt re-scheduling arrangements that reduce current interest payments, or if domestic investors buy back national debt held by foreigners reducing the overall stock of foreign debt). In the four countries analyzed in this chapter, only Greece renegotiated its debt. Yet, a slightly larger turnaround of the current account relative to the trade balance was also observed in Portugal and Spain between 2007 and 2015. This chapter focuses on the current account since it is a broader indicator of external balances and a direct measure of the difference between two key macroeconomic variables (domestic saving and domestic investment). Yet, much of the analysis carries over to the trade balance. Sharp turnarounds in trade or current account balances, triggered by the pull-out of foreign investors from a country's assets are usually dubbed in the literature on international macroeconomics as "sudden stops". • To what extent have the current account adjustments since 2008
in Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain responded to macroeconomic adjustments?
• To which extent structural reforms helped current account adjustment and in making these economies more "competitive" going forward?
• In light of recent developments in relative competitiveness and reforms, what could one expect regarding the path of their external balances going forward?
Current Account Determinants in the Eurozone
The view that the size of the current account should matter for macroeconomic performance is controversial among macroeconomists (see Obstfeld 2012 , for a broad discussion and references). After all, the current account is the net balance between gross financial flows in and out of a country, and international financial integration implies that both inflows and outflows can (and arguably should) be very large as a share of GDP. homogeneous across countries (in Spain for instance it started only in 2011-12), they do suggest that debt sustainability was becoming a growing cause of investors' concern under a less favorable global economic outlook. Since a non-trivial portion of those bonds were sold to foreigners, they were a clear counterpart of CA flows and thus a manifestation of concerns about the sustainability of these countries' own CA deficits which persisted and grew even larger for several years (as illustrated in Figure 1 ). As often witnessed in history, current account and sovereign debt crises go hand in hand. The key question is then what makes a CA deficit "sustainable" in the sense that such a constraint on further external indebtedness does not emerge.
Learning about which variables make CA position "sustainable" is clearly important for policy makers to design a system of measures -of both a conjectural and a structural nature -to mitigate the risk of abrupt reversals in the flow of external financing which can take a long-lasting toll on output and employment.
Theoretical and empirical research over the past two decades has highlighted a number of critical variables in this connection. These are listed in Table 2 . Table 3 shows how these variables affect CAs across the Eurozone. It does that by regressing the ratio of the overall current account to GDP (CA/GDP) of each of the original twelve members (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain) on the variables above starting in the year following the introduction of the Exchange Rate mechanism (1980) through 2015. 6 As standard in the analysis of cross-country CA regressions, fixed effects are omitted and all right-hand side variables are measured relative to the foreign country counterparts, in this case the EU12 (GDP weighted) average. 7 To corroborate the robustness of the estimates to the potential reversed causality from the CA to variables like the output gap, the fiscal balance, and credit growth, an instrumental variable (IV) estimator is also reported, with very similar results.
8 Table 3 shows that a relatively parsimonious model can explain about 60 percent of intra Eurozone imbalances. This is respectful explanatory power given how difficult it is to explain well CA variations over time and across countries. Scrolling down the list of explanatory variables from the top, the positive effect on NFA reflects the counter-point of two effects at play. On the one hand, a very negative net foreign asset position (like those in Southern Europe) creates a negative wealth effect and calls for a positive trade balance so that net liabilities are eventually paid off and the intertemporal budget constraint is satisfied. On the other hand, more negative sample is appropriate for the task at hand. Also, limiting the estimation to the second half of the sample, i.e., from 1996 to 2015, does not change the thrust of the results, nor does the introduction of fixed country effects. 7 See Phillips et al. (2013) for a discussion of the underlying model and various estimation issues. In particular, not including country fixed effects ensure that the global adding up constraint, i.e., the worldwide sum of CAs is zero, is met (short of the usual global measurement discrepancies). In the case of the Eurozone, because its CA imbalance with the rest of the world has been small, imposing such a quasizero adding-up constraint is also broadly warranted. Unlike in Phillips et al. (2013) growth expectations was not a significant variable in the regression in the presence of the output gap indicator owing to strong collinearity. 8 As often in the literature, the selection of instruments relies on one and two period lags of real GDP growth, and one-period lags of the primary fiscal balance and credit growth. In an alternative specification, lagged credit growth was also replaced with the lag ratio of bank credit to bank capital with very similar results and a slightly higher R-squared (0.62). A discussion of the relationship between credit growth and that bank leverage indicator is provided in section 3.
NFA implies greater flow of interest payments abroad which depresses the CA. On balance, the latter effect typically dominates in broad cross-country regressions spanning advanced and emerging market economies (see Phillips et al. 2013) . Table 3 shows that this is also the case for the Eurozone. The effect is economically large: a country that has a net foreign liability of 60-
percentage points above the EU12 average (which is roughly what
Greece, Portugal and Spain had before the 2008-12 financial crisis), should be expected to run a CA deficit of 1.5 to 2% of GDP, all else constant.
As the general empirical literature on current account determinants has also found (see Phillips et al., 2013) , differences in per capita income are also significant determinants of intra Eurozone CA imbalances. The sign of the estimates coefficient accord with a central prediction of the neo-classical model that richer countries (which are typically more capital abundant)
should export capital and hence run current account surpluses on average.
The attendant point estimate in Table 3 indicates that every US$ 5,000 increase in per-capita income relative to the EU12 weighted average improves the CA by 1 percentage point of GDP. So, the fact that Southern Eurozone members are a few thousand euros poorer (in per capita income terms) than Northern Eurozone members, together with having a 60-80% more negative NFA/GDP ratio, already puts their current accounts into substantively negative territory, of the order of 3 to 4 GDP percentage points, holding all other (particularly cyclical) considerations constant.
The following triplet of demographic variables (population growth, current dependency ratios, and the speed of its future evolution) have the expected signs and also hold significant explanatory power together, though the net effect is smaller than those of the above two variables and more disparate across countries. 9 This is both because intra-Eurozone differences in those variables are smaller and also because some of the crisis-hit countries (notably Ireland) have higher population growth and dependency ratios well below the EU12 average, whereas some of them (like Greece) have dependency ratios which are non-trivially above the EU12 average. In particular, the much lower dependency ratio of Ireland (about 11% below Yet, the regression results point to three remaining variables as key to explain both how pre-crisis "excess" imbalances arose and how the post-2008 reforms may impact future external balances in the four crisis-hit countries.
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The first is the general government balance -here entered net of interest expenses to capture the component of fiscal policy that is more closely under control of national governments and which is more exogenous to the current account. As mentioned above and widely documented elsewhere, fiscal imbalances (on both the positive and negative side) have been an important driver of external imbalances in the Eurozone. The highly significant -both 10 The level of the terms of trade does not show up as significant either.
statistically and economically -coefficient of 0.27 on the primary fiscal balance shown in Table 3 The second key variable is the gap between real GDP and its "potential" or trend level (measured as in Phillips et al., 2013 by the HP filter), i.e., the socalled "output gap". The significant negative sign of that variable indicates that when demand outpaces domestic supply (i.e., the economy is "overheated" in popular parlance), such an excess is met by a rise in imports relative to exports, thus implying that the CA balance declines.
The high-demand effect associated with a positive output gap may be counter-balanced by what happens to total factor productivity (TFP). As shown in Table 3 , higher TFP growth relative to EU partners tends to improve the CA. This positive effect is not obvious in theory because higher TFP can boost investment (insofar as it raises firms' profits) and lower savings (insofar as households anticipate higher income growth resulting from higher TFP, and increase their consumption relative to present income). Yet, a positive effect of higher TFP on the CA can also be rationalized. For one thing, a higher TFP (implying a more productive use of domestic production factors) also reduces inefficient capital, thus lowering actual investment for a given unit of output. In addition, to the extent that a higher TFP signals greater investment opportunities in the future that firms may choose to finance out of current earnings, firms may choose to distribute fewer dividends, thereby raising corporate savings. More generally, a higher TFP implies that the country can produce at lower cost and hence at lower prices than abroad. Hence, the trade balance and the CA will tend to improve with TFP growth. This interpretation is supported by the fact that TOT growth is not significant in the regression as some of its effects are already captured by TFP growth. It follows from this that structural reforms that boost TFP should also help improve the CA. The links between structural reforms and TFP will be discussed below.
Last but not least, faster growth of domestic bank credit relative to GDP shows up as major negative influence on the CA: a 10 percent rise in the ratio of credit to GDP (relative to Eurozone wide averages) leads to a CA deterioration of about 1.5% of GDP. Since the regressions in Table 3 already control for the output gap (and through it for the effects of lower real interest rates in the home country), such a strong effect of credit growth on the CA accords well with both modern theories of financial amplification, according to which credit expansion fuels aggregate demand (and often by more than it effects aggregate supply). Such a strong effect of changes in credit/GDP ratios on the CA also accords well with widespread commentary on "excessive" private sector leveraging and the importance of the bank credit channel in driving capital flows across the Eurozone (see, e.g. Lane and
McQuade 2013). As will be discussed below, since credit growth in excess of GDP is highly correlated with increases in bank sector leverage, the econometric evidence of Table 3 "desirable" CA/GDP levels, but rather those that are broadly consistent with typical historical responses of the CA to its macroeconomic determinants listed in Table 2 . Moreover, because shifts in private sector expectations (in the direction of either excessive "pessimism" or over-optimism over the repayment capacity of borrowers) are hard to measure and are deemed to have been important particularly in Ireland and Spain, this is another source of residual discrepancy between model prediction and actual CA values.
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12 Another potential sources of discrepancy are heterogeneous output composition (for instance, the higher weight of the ICT service in Ireland) and tax policies which in turn can make the "elasticity" of the current account to output and relative prices to differ. Accurately modeling and estimating those effects is, however, hard and remain an open field for future research on current account modeling. 
Macroeconomic Adjustment and External Pay-offs of Reforms
In terms of their effects on external balances, the structural reforms that Southern Europe and Ireland embarked upon and which are documented in this book can be divided into four broad categories:
i) Product market deregulation;
ii) Reforms to increase labor market flexibility;
iii) Fiscal sector streamlining aimed at promoting a path of fiscal spending consistent with economy's long-term growth potential; 13 iv) Tighter financial sector regulation and bank capitalization.
Regarding (i) and (ii), their effects on the current account are more easily seen by focusing on developments in the consumer price index (CPI) -based real exchange rate (the ratio of the domestic to the tradeweighted average of foreign CPIs expressed in the same currency) and unit labor costs (the wage cost of producing one unit of a good in the country vs. abroad, i.e. the wage adjusted for differences in labor productivity). 14 Specifically, one should expect product market deregulation to improve the allocation of resources across sectors, reduce rents, and raise TFP. As discussed in the previous sections, higher TFP tends to depreciate the real exchange rate and hence improve the CA. Put it differently, to the extent that structural reforms reduce the degrees of product and labor market "frictions" that get in the way of the efficient allocation of economic resources in any given economy, they should be expected to allow such economies to deliver quality-equivalent output at lower prices in world markets -in short, to be more "competitive", thereby strengthening their current accounts.
Taking the so-called Eurozone "core" (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, and the Netherlands) as benchmark, Figure This is not only because changes in taxation -such as higher VAT rates - 15 In general, the literature finds that there is no single universally superior price deflator to gauge changes in export performance or external "competitiveness" broadly speaking (see Chinn, 2006; and Giordano and Zollino, 2016) . Hence it is standard practice to look at alternative price indicator, as is the analysis that follows. Figure 6 with that of CPI in Figure 4 , it is clear that producers' cost fell by far more than is apparent from trends in consumer prices between the crisis-hit countries and the so-called "core" countries in the Eurozone. 16 Once again the fall was steepest for Ireland -the country which, as we have seen, experienced the largest turnaround in the current account. A comparison with Italy, where the size of imbalances to be corrected were much smaller and where some reforms were 16 One caveat about the index is that it covers the manufacturing sector only.
introduced but only more recently (implying that the effects of which cannot be yet been seen in the data), is also suggestive of how structural reforms can help lower production costs and fuel a large turnaround in the current account. Broadening the coverage of the index to reflect changes in unit labor costs viz a broad set of trading partners -as can be seen from the so-called ULC-based real exchange rate index plotted in Figure 7 -reinforces the point. Turning to the financial sector side, Table 3 has established that credit growth in excess of GDP growth has gone hand-in-hand with CA imbalances in the Eurozone in general (i.e., during "good" and "bad" times and on average across countries). 
Concluding Remarks
The dramatic current account reversals in Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and
Spain after 2008 reflect a mix of retrenchment of external private financing, major fiscal adjustments, and bank sector distress associated with highly leverage positions on the eve of the Eurozone sovereign debt crises of 2010-13. However, it also appears to reflect -even if more subtly -some of the reform effort in recent years through a reduction in unit labor costs relative to trading partners and some growth of total factor productivity -even if quite uneven across those four countries.
There are distinct reasons for some opacity is seeing through the effects of reforms on external balances. One is that the pay-off of important reforms in labor and product markets, as well in public sector, may take time, for the reasons already discussed in other chapters of this book . A second, and important reason, is that macroeconomic performance Altogether, these elements suggest a generally positive gradient running from structural reforms to improved external balances; yet, finer measures of the "pure" effect of structural reforms on the CAs of those countries will require further research and reliance on forthcoming data. Be that as it may, some general practical implications seem warranted on the basis of the evidence presented in this chapternamely:
• Fiscal adjustment (some of it stemming from reforms aiming at enhancing public sector efficiency and sustainability of public finances), financial sector de-leveraging, and generally tighter credit market conditions played key roles in the massive CA rebalancing within the Eurozone between 2008 and 2015. Thus, smaller fiscal deficits and a more capitalized and less leveraged banking sector appear to be clearly important in mitigating the risk of a return to large imbalances of the past, once output returns to potential.
• Reforms tend to improve external balances to the extent that they improve the growth of total factor productivity (TFP) relative to that of trading partners. So, if reducing external vulnerability is one of the main goals of structural reforms and if the positive supply-side effect of higher TFP on current account dominates (as in the above econometric analysis), policy makers should give some prominence to reforms that are likely to have tangible effects on TFP.
• CA improvements have been more associated with a reduction of unit labor costs than with improvements in consumer prices relative to trading partners. Prima-facie, such a decoupling not only suggests that reforms in product markets have lagged behind those in labor markets, but possibly also that the effects of the latter on the prices of final goods are still working themselves out.
Given that estimates of the elasticity of exports to changes in unit labor costs appear to be substantial (IMF, 2017) , even the modest reduction in those costs can have a non-trivial effect, so they appear to be accounting for some of the improvement in the trade balance and the CA.
• It thus follow that, to the extent that adjustment programs under the ESM and IMF stimulated reforms as part of their conditionality, those adjustment programs facilitated a reduction of external imbalances and improved "competitiveness", broadly defined.
• It must be acknowledged, however, that even correcting for the sector's confidence returns to pre-crisis levels.
